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same pretext. The injunction must issue. I am aware of the
responsibility assumed by the court in interposing to prevent the
execution of an act of the Legislature; but the complainants have
appealed to this court for protection, and I may not shrink from
the duty they have imposed upon me.
Injunction issued.
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In our last number we drew from the case of 11orris vs. J11iller,
in which the leading opinion was delivered by Lord Mansfield, an
illustration of the truth, that what a judge says in pronouncing the
judgment of the Court, is not necessarily, nor always law, though
the decision itself be correct. It was our purpose, in the present
number, to deduce a further illustration from a very recent Ameri-
can case, correctly decided, in which the opinion of the Court was
pronounced by an eminent living judge. -But on reflection, we fear
that our views for making the selection might be misapprehended,
awaking unpleasant feelings not intended to be awakened, and thus
that an injury would follow, overbalancing the good. When men
are dead, and a certain time has been given for their bones to bleach
and dry, we are all at liberty to overhaul and rattle them as we
will; but until then, great caution and circumspection are required.
That a judicial dictum is not entitled to the weight of authority,
is a very common observation, the truth of which needs not to be
enforced. But the matter we wish to bring out, lies deeper. The
remarks of Lord Mansfield, to which we called attention in our last
number, were not what are usually understood to be dicta, but they
were the very words in which the precise judgment of the Court
was pronounced, being as much the essence of the decision as any
LEGAL PRINCIPLES.
words could be. Still, even such words, expressive as they are of
the reasons or principles on which a case is decided, do not, though
the decision itself be just, always truly reflect the law.
The point we had thought more particularly to illustrate in this
number, if we had selected the case we proposed to ourselves, is,
that judges frequently state several distinct and independent rea-
sons for a decision, upon any one of which we are led to understand
they consider the case might alone repose; but on examination it
will appear that a part only of these reasons are sound. Here the
decision is correct; the reasoning accompanying it is good in part,
and vicious in part. And the thing concerning which we wish to
interpose a caution, is not to take, without examination, such rea-
soning as being just. A decision, indeed, may not be right; but
it is very much more likely to be so, than the entire reasoning of
the Court on the point; while the decision is, in the locality where
pronounced, a legal authority, but the reasoning is not.
It may appear to a person who does not please to reflect, that
the reasoning and conclusion are so connected, that both, like the
voice and echo, must bear one character as right or wrong. This,
however, is far from being so. Men do not know always, mnd per-
haps we might say usually, what it is that influences their own
judgments. If they do know, they do not always, and perhaps we
may here also say usually, mention the real thing, when called to
state their reason. Let it not be said that this observation is a
sweeping charge of dishonesty; for it is not so. When a man does
what we have thus stated, his act bears a character somewhat ap-
proximating, to say the least, towards the dishonest; yet lie does
not really mean it so, but he means to state what he thinks will be
most satisfactory to the person he addresses.
Now, this same thing enters, to a greater or less degree, into the
legal opinions of judges ; and we must, therefore study them with the
allowance and the caution thus indicated. If a judge, for example,
pronounces an opinion which he supposes is to be carefully read and
examined by a highly cultivated and intelligent bar, in the midst of
whom lie officiates, it will be more free from the blemishes we are
speaking of, than if pronounced to an ignorant bar, or to non-pro-
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fessional men. Of course, it is of. the highest importance to the
adjudication, that the case should have been -well argued; but we
are here supposing it to have been equally well argued in both
instances. And in this observation we impute no corruption to
judges; but only state a fact roaative to the workings of the human
mihd.
Besides, we should remember that a judge has no better oppor-
tunity to know what is a legal principle, than the humilest man in
the ranks of the profession. This knowledge depqnds upon the
person's natural capabilities and his experience, study and reflec-
tion. We think we have sufficiently shown that Courts do not de-
cide principles, but cases, though, of course, in deciding the latter,
they must have a certain recognition of the former.
While in these observations, we are endeavoring to correct a too
common error in the minds of professional men, we trust that our
meaning will not be misapprehended. It is *of the highest impor-
tance in studying cases, to look into the reasoning of the Court.
The necessity of this is so apparent to any professional man, that
it need not be enforced. But, at the same time, we cannot use too
much caution against being led astray by false lights.
5. :P. B.
THE DEATH OF TUE HON. THOMAS DAY.
The Ron. TnoMAs DAY died at Hartford, Conn., March 1, 1S55. The
pages of this journal have been enriched, on more than one occasion, by
important legal matters from his pen. Mr. Day was born on the 6th of
July, 1777, and was a decendant in the sixth generation from Robert
Day, who came to Massachusetts in 1638.
The editorial labors of Thomas Day commenced as early as 1805, when
he began to report regularly the Decisions of the Supreme Court of
Errors; but he took notes of cases in the latter half of the 18th century,
and his reports cover a period ranging through more than half a century.
At the June Term, 1853, he declined a re-appointment, and the Supreme
Court of Errors were pleased to express their high respect for his eminent
services and exalted character, and to thank him for his advancement of
juridical science through his numerous reports, and other legal produc-
